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Context: People do not always make health-related decisions which reﬂect their best interest –
best interest being deﬁned as the decision they would make if they carefully considered the
options and fully understood the information available. A substantial literature has
developed in behavioral economics and social psychology that seeks to elucidate the
patterns in individual decision-making. While this is particularly relevant to healthcare, the
insights from these ﬁelds have only been applied in a limited way. To address the health
challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century, healthcare providers and healthcare systems designers
need to more fully understand how individuals are making decisions. Methods: We provide
an overview of the theories of behavioral economics and social psychology that relate to
how individuals make health-related decisions. The concentration on health-related decisions
leads to a focus on three topics: (1) mental shortcuts and motivated reasoning; (2)
implications of time; and (3) implications of affect. The ﬁrst topic is relevant because
health-related decisions are often made in a hurry without a full appreciation of the
implications and the deliberation they warrant. The second topic is included because the link
between a decision and its health-related outcomes can involve a signiﬁcant time lag. The
ﬁnal topic is included because health and affect are so often linked. Findings: The literature
reviewed has implications for healthcare training and delivery. Selection for medical training
must consider the skills necessary to understand and adapt to how patients make decisions.
Training on the insights garnered from behavioral economics and social psychology would
better prepare healthcare providers to effectively support their clients to lead healthy lives.
Healthcare delivery should be structured to respond to the way in which decisions are made.
Conclusions: These patterns in decision-making call into question basic assumptions our
healthcare system makes about the best way to treat patients and deliver care. This literature
has implications for the way we train physicians and deliver care.
Keywords: decision-making; decision theory; health behavior; choice behavior
1. Introduction
Imagine that when making choices patients coolly and calmly evaluated every option available to
them and, after considering all relevant information, selected the option that they determined to be
best. Healthcare delivery would be straight forward. Providers would present relevant information
and patients would choose the best course of action. Healthcare systems would need focus only on
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ment, with no concern for how patients may be making decisions that are not goodfor their health.
In actuality, decision-making is complicated, with different decision-making strategies being
employed in different circumstances. People may be rushed and take mental shortcuts. Their
emotions may cloud their judgment. They may be overly optimistic and fail to realistically evalu-
ate risks. A failure to recognize this complexity can lead to healthcare which is inefﬁcient, poss-
ibly ineffectual, and in some instances harmful. Social psychology and behavioral economics
provide an increasingly clear picture of when people will use one or another strategy, but relevant
insights from these subjects are largely ignored in the training of healthcare professionals, leaving
them with only a lay understanding of what is the most important determinant of health – indi-
vidual behavior (World Health Organization, 2011). Studies in social psychology and behavioral
economics have highlighted numerous instances where an appreciation of how people are making
decisions would beneﬁt those who seek to inﬂuence such decisions, including healthcare provi-
ders. For example, a bias for the status quo and how if a healthcare provider makes a certain
option the default, patients will more likely opt for that option, even if they are free to choose
others (Halpern, Ubel, & Asch, 2007).
Individual behaviors are inﬂuenced by an array of social, political, cultural, and physical
factors – many of which are largely out of individuals’ control. There is extensive evidence in
the epidemiological and biological literature that factors such as where someone lives, their
place in a social hierarchy and whether they were abused in early childhood can put them at dra-
matically higher risk for all-cause morbidity and mortality, including chronic diseases heavily
inﬂuenced by behaviors (Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Diez Roux et al., 2001;
Dube et al., 2003; Felitti et al., 1998; Malmstrom, Johansson, & Sundquist, 2001; Marmot,
Shipley, & Rose, 1984; Marmot & Smither, 1991; Pickett & Pearl, 2001). However, within
groups at high risk for behavior-related premature morbidity and mortality there are circles of
people who nevertheless make healthy choices and overlapping circles of people who have unex-
pectedly good health outcomes. That some people make healthy choices within a high-risk
context highlights the importance of understanding how such decisions are made and asking if
it is possible to encourage and support more people to do the same.
Decision science should be thought of as a “basic science” of healthcare delivery. Healthcare
providers should be trained in this basic science to improve efﬁciency and effectiveness of care.
Just as microbiology and virology lead to biomedical advances, insights from the decision
sciences lead to better approaches to providing care and counseling to individual patients.
In 1993, Redelmeier, Rozin, and Kahneman (1993), writing in JAMA, outlined ways in which
intuitive decision-making may lead patients to take decisions which are bad for their health. They
went on to argue “that an awareness of how people reason is an important clinical skill that can be
promoted by knowledge of selected past studies in psychology” (p. 73). We argue the same, and
ask why, 20 years later, decision-making does not receive the attention it deserves in medical
training. Medical training is now lagging behind popular literature. Insights from social psychol-
ogy, and increasingly from behavioral economics, are no longer conﬁned to academic journals,
but are the subject of popular books: for example, Kahneman’s( 2011) Thinking, fast and slow
or Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
Recent literature has reinforced the points made by Redelmeier et al. (1993). Swindell,
McGuire, and Halpern (2010), for example, provide examples of the ways in which knowledge
of decision strategies should change the ways physicians interact with and present information to
patients. While we agree with the arguments made, we believe that the implications are not fully
appreciated. We argue here that it is inappropriate to view a better understanding of decision-
making as simply a potentially beneﬁcial addition to healthcare; rather it should be seen as a
central concern for healthcare training and delivery. Techniques such as motivational interviewing
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not be seen as specialized methods, but rather as central approaches, and students should be pro-
vided with the theoretical underpinnings so they are able to appreciate the importance of such
methods. Furthermore, we stress that a superﬁcial understanding of decision-making will not
be enough. As mentioned previously, individuals’ behavior is heavily inﬂuenced by the
context in which they live. To appreciate how context and decision-making strategies may be
interacting requires a signiﬁcant engagement with both sets of literature.
Our focus is on patients, but it is obvious that healthcare providers themselves may also be
applying mental shortcuts or other decision-making strategies which are not in the best interest
of the patient. The potential for physicians to be inﬂuenced by cognitive biases and heuristics
has also received recent attention (Croskerry, 2013). System designers need to keep in mind
that the patient examples we provide could equally apply to providers.
This paper is concerned with how healthcare providers and systems, and in particular primary
care providers and systems, can inﬂuence general lifestyle decisions, such as those related to diet
and exercise. In this paper we highlight a number of decision strategies which have been identiﬁed
in the literature. This brief sampling of the literature provides a powerful support to the argument
that ignoring these insights in healthcare training and delivery is ill-advised.
2. Insights into health-related decision-making
It is important to draw a distinction between when an individual makes a decision which may be
bad for their health because they do not understand the available information and when they make
such a decision because they are applying a particular decision-making strategy. Misunderstand-
ings associated with low levels of literacy and numeracy are common and a source of concern
(Kutner, Greenberg, Jin, Paulsen, & White, 2006; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Williams,
Baker, Honig, Lee, & Nowlan, 1998; Woloshin, Schwartz, Moncur, Gabriel, & Tosteson,
2001). Misunderstandings have been linked to non-adherence to medical advice, and as a
result of non-adherence, to poor health outcomes (Estrada, Martin-Hryniewicz, Peek, Collins,
& Byrd., 2004; Gazmararian, Williams, Peel, & Baker, 2003; Kalichman, Ramachandra, &
Catz, 1999; Schillinger et al., 2002). Numeracy skills in particular hinder individuals’ ability to
weigh health-related risks, at times leading to poor choices (Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, &
Welch, 1997). Moreover, literacy and numeracy have been linked to difﬁculties with day-to-
day health-related decision-makings, such as interpreting nutritional information (Peters,
Hibbard, Slovic, & Dickmann, 2007; Rothman et al., 2006). Misunderstandings are important
and training for healthcare providers on when to expect them and how to address them is poten-
tially very useful. However, even without training, healthcare providers are likely to be aware that
misunderstandings are a problem; whereas they may not be aware of the implications of different
decision-making strategies.
The decision-making strategy employed by an individual depends on, among other things,
how much time they have, their circumstances and characteristics, the information that is avail-
able to them, their emotional state and the type of decision being made (Kahneman, 2011). To
highlight the importance of training healthcare providers in decision science we examine three
(overlapping) topics, namely: (1) mental shortcuts and motivated reasoning; (2) implications of
time; and (3) implications of affect. The topics were selected as they provide powerful examples
of decision-making strategies which are relevant to healthcare providers, particularly those pro-
viders wishing to encourage behavior change or promote informed decision-making. Mental
shortcuts are particularly relevant in the healthcare setting. Brief episodic encounters with health-
care providers may generate a pressure for a quick decision. Moreover, healthcare providers’
actions may unintentionally inﬂuence the outcome of that decision. Motivated reasoning is
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their patients continue to base their actions on a previously formed conclusion. The consequences
of health-related decisions are rarely instantaneous and often occur long after an interaction with a
healthcare provider seeking to support that individual. How individuals are considering the
passage of time in their decision-making is, therefore, critical. Affect, the ﬁnal topic, can be
heavily inﬂuenced by healthcare providers, particularly through their framing of decisions.
Given the implications of affect on decision-making, an awareness of this mechanism is arguably
critically important for healthcare providers. These topics are intended as examples and do not
provide a deﬁnitive summary of the relevant aspects of the social psychology and behavioral
economics literatures. They are intended to highlight why these literatures are relevant to health-
care training and delivery.
2.1 Mental shortcuts and motivated reasoning
People do not always (or even often) carefully consider the costs and beneﬁts of every option
available to them; time constraints or the perception that the decision is not a critical one can
lead individuals to apply mental shortcuts (heuristics) or stick with the status quo (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). As a result, even when they understand the information provided to
them, people make decisions (including health-related decisions) that may be contrary to their
considered desires. The beneﬁt gained from spending additional time on a decision may or
may not be worth the effort. The key is to identify when heuristics or other shortcuts are being
applied to decisions which warrant more careful consideration. Training healthcare providers
on the common mental shortcuts will help them identify when their patients may be applying
them to health-related decisions which warrant more consideration. Examples of common heur-
istics and shortcuts include the representativeness heuristic, the anchoring heuristic and the status
quo bias (Kahneman, 2011).
Predicting when the representativeness heuristic may be being applied, for example, is poten-
tially critical. This heuristic is applied when individuals are considering the likelihood that an
uncertain event will occur. Rather than focus on available statistical information such as the esti-
mated probability of the event or the sample size on which that estimate is based, individuals con-
sider more easily understood information, namely how similar to or representative of other known
situations the uncertain event is (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The representativeness heuristic is
often applied when individuals are estimating their risk of contracting an illness. Gerend, Aiken,
West, and Erchull (2004) investigated women’s perception of their risk of breast cancer, conges-
tive heart failure, and osteoporosis. They found that the extent to which a woman perceived
herself to be similar to the average woman who contracted one of those diseases accounted for
a large amount of the variance in perceived susceptibility. If healthcare providers assume that a
patient is basing their decisions on the statistical information they have provided them to
assess their risk, they may miss that the patient is under- or overestimating risk because they con-
sider themselves either dissimilar or similar, respectively, to the stereotype they have of a person
who suffers for the condition being discussed.
Healthcare providers similarly need to be aware of the anchoring heuristic which occurs when
people make estimates about uncertain events by assimilating information they already have.
Anchoring is problematic when they assimilate irrelevant information (Epley & Gilovich, 2006).
For example, a random number mentioned at the outset of an interview has been seen to inﬂuence
people’s answers to a range of questions from the length of the Mississippi to the weight of Caesar
(Furnham & Boo, 2011). Klein and Stefanek (2007) note that in the conversations physicians have
with patients about personal risk, anchors could come from a variety of statements not related to the
topic at hand. Moreover, patients use their subjective risk as an anchor and will not adjust their
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risk. Senay and Kaphingst (2009), for example, report that counseling for women who overesti-
mated their risk for breast cancer failed to lower risk estimates to realistic levels. Again, a failure
to recognize that this is occurring could result in a healthcare provider incorrectly assuming that
a patient is making a decision based on a realistic assessment of risk.
Perhaps the most straight forward shortcut that healthcare providers should be aware of is the
status quo bias – the tendency to choose what is seen as the default, even if it is not the best option
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Halpern et al. (2007) discuss several ways that the status quo
bias could be used to inﬂuence individual decisions relating to health. For example, to increase
rates of participation, organ and cadaver donation, pneumococcal vaccination for hospitalized
patients, and HIV screening during regular check-ups could all be opt-out rather than opt-in.
Lessons from decision science not only help identify when shortcuts are being applied, but
also suggest approaches to minimize their application. It has been shown that individuals will
spend more time and energy reasoning if they are motivated to be accurate (Kunda, 1990). Simi-
larly when they believe their judgments will be made public or that they will have to justify them,
they are less likely to use anchoring or stereotypes (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985).
An awareness of mental shortcuts can aid in the identiﬁcation of opportunities within the
healthcare setting to assist patients in making the decision that best represents that patient’s
desires and values. Moreover, if healthcare providers understand their shortcuts they can try
and identify when in day-to-day life individuals are applying them to decisions that have impor-
tant negative implications for their health and work to ﬁnd ways to support them to do otherwise.
2.2 Implications of time
Understanding decisions which require considering costs and beneﬁts at different points in time is
important in the context of healthcare, and in particular primary care, as outcomes of decisions
relating to health typically play out over time. Exercise, healthy eating, smoking, utilizing health-
care services, adhering to drug regimens, and many other behaviors all require the person decid-
ing to undertake (or not) such a behavior to consider the consequences for their future. A failure to
understand these processes will often lead to missed opportunities to promote healthy lifestyles,
and as a result, to inefﬁcient care.
Numerous studies have shown that the majority of individuals do not have time consistent
preferences, i.e. they discount highly in the short term, but soon start to be relatively indifferent
between longer and longer waits. Behavioral economists refer to this as hyperbolic discounting.
Evidence of hyperbolic discounting has been observed in a variety of contexts (Cairns & van der
Pol, 2000; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000), including various models of animal preferences
(Freeman, Green, Myerson, & Woolverton, 2009; Richards, Mitchell, Wit, & Seiden, 1997).
Hyperbolic discounting is a concern for healthcare providers as it may affect the reliability of
patients’ stated intentions. A patient may state that next week they will start exercising after
work before going home to watch television. However, when next week comes, the cost of delay-
ing television watching is seen as too high and they go straight home. The patient is not lying,
theirpreferences are simply time inconsistent. This dynamic is often apparent with problem drink-
ing (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).
Time inconsistent preferences also arise when individuals have difﬁculty predicting how a
visceral state will affect their decision-making. Such state dependent preference switching is
referred to as the “hot–cold empathy gap” and has been documented in numerous contexts.
Nordgren, van der Pligt, and van Harreveld (2008) found that dieters and smokers in satiated
states were more likely to set ambitious quitting or weight loss goals for themselves, while
those who were currently hungry or craving set more modest goals. Similarly it has been
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gratiﬁcation, which satiated opioid addicts underestimate the strength of their cravings, and that
prior to labor, women underestimate their desire for an epidural (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006;
Badger et al., 2007; Chistensen-Szalanski, 1984).
Healthcare providers who are not aware of the tendency for individuals to have time incon-
sistent preferences may adopt different strategies to those who are aware. When a patient does
not follow through on a stated intention the unaware provider may assume that the patients are
simply lying or not committed enough to the behavior. Aware providers could explain time incon-
sistent preferences to their patients and together work on strategies to address the problem; for
example, working through “what if?” scenarios with the patient.
Similarly, aware healthcare providers could work with patients to help them identify other pre-
dictive shortcomings such as the optimism bias. This bias refers to the well-documented phenom-
enon that individuals frequently underestimate their risk of experiencing negative life and health
events. Clarke, Lovegrove, Williams, and Machperson (2000), for example, surveyed women and
men about their estimates of breast and prostate cancer risk; both groups demonstrated an opti-
mism bias relating to their perceived risk, beneﬁts of screening, and years surviving after diagno-
sis. Providers must, however, be cautious not to over correct for optimism, a pessimistic outlook
leading to depression is hardly an appropriate goal.
To identify when the optimism bias may be in play, it is useful to understand where it stems
from. A variety of sources have been identiﬁed. Klein and Helweg-Larsen (2002), for example,
suggest that the greater amount of control an individual believes they have over an event or situ-
ation, the less they estimate their personal risk to be. Weinstein (1987) emphasizes that individuals
tend to extrapolate from past experience to estimate future risk, concluding that if the problem has
not yet appeared, one is exempt from future risks. Perloff and Fetzer (1986) found that when asked
tomakecomparisonsbetweenthemselvesandothers,andthetargetwasleftsufﬁcientlyvague, indi-
viduals tended to construct downward comparisons so that they could perceive themselves as less
vulnerable. This motivational aspect of the optimism bias, of wanting (even if only at a subcon-
scious level) to perceive oneself as less vulnerable, is especially apparent in studies carried out
with smokers. A survey of community college students, for example, found that 42% of smokers
believed that continuing to smoke would hurt their health only a little, if at all, and 45% believed
that quitting would provide little if any health beneﬁt (Prokhorov et al., 2003).
Although people tend to be too optimistic about the likelihood that negative events will not
occur, they tend to be pessimistic about how well they would cope with them should they
occur. When asked to predict what their quality of life would be while suffering a speciﬁc
illness, healthy individuals often estimate a lower quality of life than that which is reported by
actual sufferers. Sackett and Torrance (1978) found that on the health-related quality of life
scale (0 being death and 1.0 being perfect health), dialysis patients reported a .56 while
healthy patients estimated a .39. Using the same scale, patients without colostomies estimated
a .8 while patients with colostomies reported a .92 (Boyd, Sutherland, Heasman, Tritchler, &
Cummings, 1990). These discrepancies have been attributed to healthy individuals not anticipat-
ing the ways in which they would successfully adapt to poorer health. Indeed, by focusing study
participants’ attention on the ways in which they could adapt to a chronic illness or disability, the
size of the discrepancy between quality of life estimates of healthy and sick individuals is seen to
decrease (Ubel, Jepson, & Loewenstein, 2005).
In the health domain, decisions and outcomes are often separated by a substantial amount of
time. The way in which patients consider time in their decision-making is therefore central to
health-related decision-making. Understanding how people incorporate time, and in particular
how this can lead to apparently inconsistent preferences over time, is critical to supporting
patients to make, and follow through with, healthy decisions.
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People’s judgments can be inﬂuenced by the emotional state they are in at the time they make a
decision. The implications of this range from switching preferences based merely on how a
problem is framed to how people understand and respond to risk. Being aware of the ways in
which these factors can inﬂuence decision-making can help healthcare providers think through
how and when options are presented. If providers are unaware, they may be inadvertently promot-
ing a particular choice, which may or may not be to the beneﬁt of the patient.
Loss aversion is a powerful emotional response which can affect decision-making – people
are more sensitive to losses than they are to equivalent gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Loss aversion helps explain why negative or positive framing of potential health outcomes can
inﬂuence the treatment options that individuals select. For example, when participants in a
study were provided with the prognostic outcome information for an infant born at 23 weeks
framed as either survival with lack of disability (positive) or chance of dying and likelihood of
disability (negative), those participants given the gain-framed messages were more likely to
elect resuscitation over comfort care (Haward, Murphy, & Lorenz, 2008). Rothman and
Salovey (1997) found that people were more likely to carry out illness detection behaviors
when the messaging they received was loss framed. It has been suggested that loss aversion
occurs because individuals underestimate their ability to rationalize loss and overestimate their
tendency to dwell on it and so are willing to engage in riskier behavior to avoid it (Kermer,
Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006).
In addition to being aware of loss aversion, it is important to consider the implications of a
decision-maker’s affect on their perception of risk. Johnson and Tversky (1983) induced feelings
of negative or positive affect in study participants and then asked them to estimate the frequency
of various fatalities. They found that participants who had induced negative affect were more
likely to perceive the various causes of death as more likely than those who had positive affect
induced. A study carried out after the 11 September terrorist attacks induced either fear or
anger in participants regarding those events and then asked them to rate the likelihood of
events related to the attacks such as whether the USA would capture Osama bin Laden. Those
participants in the anger condition provided more optimistic responses than those in the fear con-
dition (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003).
Healthcare providers are often faced with having to deal with emotional topics and with
patients in emotional states. Moreover, providers often have control over how options are
framed. Anticipating the importance of framing and affect can help providers think through the
best ways to support patients.
The cursory review of the above three topics suggests that contrary to being perfectly rational,
individuals may be misinformed, biased, and/or inconsistent when making decisions related to
their health. The notion that people coolly and rationally weigh the known, quantiﬁed risks
and beneﬁts of different courses of action, as argued in the economic theory of rational choice,
does not hold empirically (Kahneman, 2011). When viewed in light of the central role that indi-
vidual health-related decisions play in determining health outcomes, these ﬁndings challenge
some of the most basic tenets of how health providers interact with patients and by implication,
of how future providers are prepared for the practice of medicine.
3. Implications for healthcare training
As a result of many factors, but, in particular, the highly inﬂuential Flexner Report on medical
education, US medical training in the twentieth century came to focus almost exclusively on bio-
medical science, with consideration of human behaviors, psychology, and interactions included
as, at best, an afterthought. Until very recently, premedical requirements and testing were
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istry. Likewise, the primary curriculum in the pre-clinical years of medical training came to be
built around anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, and pathophysiology, with courses on patient
interviewing and social sciences ﬁtted in around the margins. In clinical training, with the
notable exception of Family Medicine programs, hospital-based medicine predominates, with
much briefer exposure to ambulatory and community-based healthcare.
A health workforce with such a narrow focus on biomedical science in its selection and train-
ing will be ill-prepared to meet the health needs of its future patients and of society. This is not to
suggest that healthcare should be grounded in anything but the most rigorous possible empirical,
scientiﬁc basis; but rather that a health workforce well-prepared to address the key drivers of pre-
mature morbidity and mortality would have training that balances, with equal sophistication and
emphasis, social with biomedical science. This would suggest fairly sweeping changes which we
will only brieﬂy touch on here, including the need to select candidates for healthcare training with
substantive preparation and demonstrated competence in the social sciences and emotional as well
as intellectual intelligence; to re-structure pre-clinical and clinical training to include robust and
rigorous training in human systems and social sciences, particularly in ﬁelds such as social psy-
chology and behavioral economics, but also in organizational behavior and systems engineering;
and to reform graduate medical training so that it is focused on preparing a workforce that delivers
a high-quality, high-value service to patients and society – likely one less focused on hospital
medicine and rescue care and more focused on prevention and behavior change. Such changes
in training may not be needed across the broad range of healthcare providers. Those involved
in purely technical aspects of healthcare, such as laboratory technicians, are not in as great a
need of understanding decision-making as those who engage directly with patients or design pro-
grams and systems which shape patients’ environments. Doctors, nurses, counselors, and system
designers are the primary targets for revised training.
The good news is that these types of changes have already begun. The American Association
of Medical Colleges recently announced that the Medical College Admission Test will be restruc-
tured so that nearly half its emphasis is on social and behavioral sciences and critical readings that
emphasize questions of ethics and cross-cultural studies. Innovative medical schools and pro-
grams, with approaches that integrate biomedical and social science and community-based, multi-
disciplinary approaches into their core curriculum, have sprung up around the country. This
transformation could be hastened by changes in the design of graduate medical education
funding to enable and incentivize further innovations in medical training and to produce trainees
capable of integrating biomedical and social science and of leading the high-value healthcare
delivery systems of the future.
4. Implications for healthcare delivery
Insights from decision science should inﬂuence the re-design of healthcare delivery and the prac-
tice of medicine as we move toward systems that achieve better health outcomes at lower cost.
The current paradigm, which relies largely on brief, episodic interactions between providers
and patients and the straightforward, static presentation of probabilistic information about the
risks and beneﬁts of different courses of action understandably and manifestly fails to support
patients’ healthy choices.
A person’s health is determined through a complex, adaptive process. While traditional
approaches to healthcare have predominantly focused on the safety and efﬁcacy of individual,
often short-term interventions (diets, medications, surgical procedures, and other behavioral inter-
ventions), decision science suggests that individuals do not think and act ina rational, linear way–
and, even if they did, they would be subject to large-scale changes beyond their immediate control
66 C. Desmond et al.in their sociopolitical and physical, external environment, which profoundly impact their health.
Real-world effectiveness in healthcare delivery will be greatly enhanced by a systems approach
that focuses on achieving outcomes through dynamic and diverse processes. Providers and health-
care delivery systems should work with patients to identify measurable, personally meaningful
goals to work toward together, rather than focusing only on agendas of speciﬁc interventions
for speciﬁc disease processes, prioritized largely by providers and the structures and incentives
built into the healthcare system. Some examples of how to make this shift are given below.
4.1 Improve longitudinal relationships and communication between patients and
providers
The current paradigm of predominantly visit-based interactions between patients and providers is
not well-suited to how people make decisions about their health. Earlier a number of causes of
time inconsistent preferences and inability to predict outcomes were discussed. Healthcare deliv-
ery systems must capitalize on the explosion of innovation in communication technologies to fun-
damentally change how providers and patients interact. Shorter, more frequent, asynchronous
interactions (e.g. over email or even text message or Twitter) may more effectively support
patients in their decision-making process and make more efﬁcient use of providers’ time.
Models for healthcare organization and, particularly, reimbursement will need to change to
accommodate this new communication paradigm. Asynchronous interactions should not
replace all visit-based interactions as these are essential to relationship building. They do,
however, provide options to strengthen support and increase the chance of behavior change, in
a way that a visit only system does not.
4.2 Understand the emotional side of health decision-making
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that people are inﬂuenced at least as much by emotions
and affect as by intellectual reasoning when making decisions about their health. Being careful to
never manipulate this reality, providers should balance their presentation of risks to patients with
substantive appeals to emotions and not just to intellect. The power of different framings is
substantial.
4.3 Focus on mental health
Given the effect of affect on decision-making and the high prevalence of mental illness, particu-
larly among the chronically ill, we can no longer afford for sophisticated approaches to mental
health to be the purview of a relatively small group of highly trained specialist providers.
Mental healthcare must be integrated into all aspects of healthcare delivery and providers must
be much more knowledgeable about mental illness and cognizant of the impact that an altered
affect can have on all other aspects of patient care.
5. Conclusion
People are complex and this complexity is reﬂected in the decisions they make and the behaviors
that result. If rational choice theory was correct and individuals carefully evaluated the costs,
beneﬁts, and risks associated with every option available to them, the work of healthcare provi-
ders would be simple. Healthcare providers would only need to focus on diagnosis and providing
information on alternative responses. They would not need to be concerned that patients might be
applying mental shortcuts and not giving the various options due consideration or selecting the
default option because they think it is being recommended. They would not need to worry
Health Psychology & Behavioral Medicine 67about how they frame options, as framing would make no difference. They would not be con-
cerned that what the patient commits to do and what they will actually do will differ because
of the hot–cold empathy gap.
Given the importance of behavior in determining health outcomes and the complexity of
decision-making, it is critically important for healthcare providers to make use of the insights
into this complexity which are available in the socio-psychology and behavioral economics litera-
tures. The brief review of these literatures summarized here provides an indication of the types of
insights on which a foundation of a fuller understanding of health-related decision-making can be
built. This fuller understanding can, in turn, assist in the training of healthcare providers – better
preparing graduates to support patients to make and maintain healthy decisions. Moreover, these
insights can inform the re-design of healthcare systems to take greater advantage of interactions
with patients.
The insights provided by these literatures are informative, but they are also limited. The lit-
erature points to when a certain decision-making strategy is more likely to be employed. This
works well when explaining the distribution of decision outcomes across a population. The
healthcare provider is often faced with an individual, not a population. Further work to identify
predictors of decision strategies could make efforts to limit the use of inappropriate or harmful
strategies more efﬁcient.
What would also support the adaptation of these insights to the healthcare setting is to conduct
research speciﬁcally focused on health-related decision-making. The interaction between
approaches to healthcare provisions and application of heuristics and motivated reasoning in
relation to health-related decisions would be particularly informative. The results of such research
would create opportunities for further adjustments to provide training and healthcare delivery and
hopefully for more effective and efﬁcient systems of care. The potential use of technology to
support the maintenance of healthy behaviors is already an area of research and should be sup-
ported. Finally, a critical area of research would be to test if the adaptations to training suggested
in this paper will have the expected impact on the quality of healthcare provision.
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